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1 Are small countries able to set their own interest
rates? Assessing the implications of the
macroeconomic trilemma
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Abstract
According to the ’macroeconomic trilemma’ the ability of small economies to pur-
sue an independent monetary policy is jointly determined by country speciﬁc foreign
exchange (FX) rate ﬂexibility and capital mobility. In particular, free ﬂoating economies
should be able to isolate domestic interest rates even under globalized capital markets.
Recent evidence casts doubts if this gain in independence is substantial. Taking advan-
tage of semiparametric functional regression models we study the trade-off among FX
stability, capital mobility and monetary autonomy for a panel of 20 developed small
economies. Conﬁrming the macroeconomic trilemma, the exposure to foreign inter-
est rates is found to increase with country speciﬁc states of exchange rate stability and
capital mobility. Gains in monetary independence appear substantial for countries that
abdicate to peg their FX rates, but the marginal beneﬁt of tolerating higher exposure
to FX volatility quickly vanishes. Free ﬂoating economies might therefore be able to
moderately stabilize FX rates at little cost.
Keywords: monetary independence, macroeconomic trilemma, monetary policy, exchange
rate regime, interest rates, functional coefﬁcients, semiparametric models.
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The macroeconomic trilemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2005) suggests that the
openness of capital markets and the ﬂexibility of FX rates jointly determine the extent to
which small economies are able to isolate domestic interest rates from world interest rates.
For small open economies, achieving a certain degree of autonomy over domestic inter-
est rates is only possible by accepting some loss of control over domestic exchange rates
and vice versa. Accordingly, monetary dependence matters for small open economies that
stabilize their FX rates to currencies of larger partner countries by means of FX market
interventions. More indirectly, monetary dependence also matters for economies that are
subjected to the notion of ’Fear of Floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Though not neces-
sarily intervening on foreign FX markets, such formally ’ﬂoating’ economies tend to follow
world market interest rate movements to prevent strong adjustments of exchange rates. In
both cases, however, the autonomy over domestic interest rates is determined by the extent
of FX ﬂexibility that monetary authorities are willing to tolerate. Hence, every small open
economy that allocates nonzero weight to the FX rate target in its policy function should
be subjected to a certain lack of monetary independence. The possibility to choose among
a number of distinct domestic policy strategies is the lead argument to allow for a ﬂoating
currency (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). Therefore, a comprehensive empirical assessment of
this trade-off is of core importance for a sensible evaluation if (and to what extent) a given
economy should stabilize FX rates. Recent empirical evidence casts doubt if actual gains in
monetary independence are substantial. Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2004) suggest that,
similar to pegs, full transmission of global interest rates also holds for free ﬂoating regimes,
at least in the long run. According to Frankel et al. (2004), only three economies were able
to set their own interest rates over the 1990s, namely Germany, Japan and the US. Presum-
ing that the decision to either pursue a peg or nonpeg (i.e. to allow for some variation in
FX rates) factually matters for the monetary independence of small economies, Shambaugh
(2004) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) ﬁnd interest rates of pegs to follow the base countries’ rates
closer in comparison with nonpegs.
The issue of monetary independence has been investigated mostly by means of rather
restrictive econometric models. The conventional approach is conditional on a heuristic
classiﬁcation with respect to an observed or declared status of FX rate ﬂexibility. Then, as-
suming parameter homogeneity within class speciﬁc subsamples, (unbalanced) pooled panel
1regression models for interest rate transmission are estimated. Available empirical evidence
might suffer from the following shortcomings. Firstly, a conventional de facto classiﬁcation
ofexchangerate ﬂexibilitysuch as pegs vs. nonpegs(Shambaugh 2004, Obstfeld et al. 2005)
could be too restrictive. Moreover, the assumption of parameter homogeneity within rather
general groups is likely violated and might lead to biased panel estimates. In fact, many
economies do neither pursue pure pegs nor pure ﬂoats (Fischer 2001, Yeyati and Sturzeneg-
ger 2005). Furthermore, these (country speciﬁc) FX policies may also continuously vary
over time according to the relative weight of FX targets in monetary policy functions. To
assess the macroeconomic trilemma, the apparent time and country speciﬁc heterogeneity
that prevails in the data should be fully exploited, rather than relying on restrictive (pooled)
panel regressions. In addition, a lack of selectivity among country speciﬁc policy options
with regard to FX ﬂexibility limits the scope of empirical results for monetary policy ad-
vice. Hence, a continuous classiﬁcation of time varying country speciﬁc (de facto) exchange
rate ﬂexibility appears to be preferable to heuristic static classiﬁcations. Secondly, former
studies primarily focus at the impact of exchange rate stability on monetary independence,
while the joint impact of capital mobility and exchange rate ﬂexibility has not been suf-
ﬁciently highlighted yet. While Frankel et al. (2004) indirectly consider capital mobility
by modelling time speciﬁc subsamples, Shambaugh (2004) provides estimates for interest
rate transmission conditional on capital mobility (classiﬁed according to the existence and
absence of capital barriers) and currency regime type (peg vs. nonpeg). However, as a con-
sequence of country speciﬁc currency risk premia, capital mobility might substantially differ
across economies with liberalized capital markets, especially in case of nonpegs. Distin-
guishing between absence of capital barriers and capital mobility might not be essential for
a comparison of transmission dynamics among (credible) pegs and nonpegs, but it matters
for a comprehensive, continuous assessment of the macroeconomic trilemma. For instance,
consider the case of economies following a reference countries’ interest rates to prevent ﬂuc-
tuations of its exchange rate. For a given (accepted) degree of FX rate variability, country
speciﬁc independence crucially depends on the extent of capital mobility, as it determines
the strength of reactions of FX rates to unilateral interest rate changes. Hence, cross cor-
relation of interest rate changes should continuously increase with capital mobility for all
economies that attribute nonzero weight to FX targets. In a general model, therefore, in-
terest rate transmission should be evaluated conditional on a continuum of representative
states characterized by country speciﬁc factual FX ﬂexibility and capital mobility. Thirdly,
2comovements among international interest rates have been assumed to reﬂect a loss of mon-
etary autonomy in general, although the prevalence of real business cycle linkages suggests
that central banks could independently choose a similar stance of monetary policy. There-
fore, country speciﬁc domestic policy rules that include, for instance, observed deviations
from steady states of inﬂation, output and FX rates might also deserve consideration in an
empirical model. Lastly, an analysis of monetary independence should be conducted within
an uniform empirical model. Respecting the latter premise is not trivial since the cointegra-
tion link to world interest rates is known to prevail only for a small set of nominal interest
rates. To circumvent this difﬁculty, Frankel et al. (2004), Shambaugh (2004) and Obst-
feld et al. (2005) employ an econometric approach suggested by Pesaran, Shin and Smith
(2001). This methodology allows for unique model estimation irrespectively if cointegration
holds. However, it somehow exchanges the problem of model choice against the selection of
critical values for inferential purposes which depend on assumptions concerning a (unique)
cointegration order that characterizes the data.
To address these issues, the empirical model in this work is implemented in the frame-
work of ﬂexible semiparametric functional coefﬁcient models (Cai, Fan and Yao 2000, Her-
wartz and Xu, 2009). It allows interest rate transmission parameters to be estimated as a
(nonlinear) function of both the current state of measurable FX variability and capital mo-
bility. Moreover, country speciﬁc domestic fundamentals such as gaps of output, inﬂation
and FX rates are included to identify if dependence of interest rates is induced by interna-
tional capital ﬂows or reﬂects independent policy steps under real economic linkages. Using
a slightly modiﬁed concept of long run monetary dependence, we allow the domesticinterest
rates toadjusttoaﬂexible(i.e. local)steady stateobtainedby Hodrick-Prescott(HP) ﬁltering
the interest rate differential1 . Since deviations from HP implied steady states are stationary
by construction, standard inferential tools apply irrespectively if cointegration features a sys-
tem of international interest rates or not. Hence, adjustment dynamics can be analyzed in a
unique model representation. The considered panel comprises quarterly data for 20 devel-
oped economies collected after the great moderation period 1987Q1-2008Q2.
Assessing the full trade-off among FX stability, capital mobility and monetary autonomy
in a general model improves upon earlier studies since it allows to quantify the presumed ef-
fects of any given reduction in country speciﬁc exchange rate ﬂexibility on monetary auton-
1Withrespectto theuncoveredinterestrateparity,theHPtrendshouldreﬂectgeneraldifferencesininﬂation
rates (implying a permanently expected change in the domestic FX rate) or persistent premia for currency risk
3omy. Since monetary authorities might not realize substantial gains in independence when
tolerating high variability in FX rates, this aspect is of natural interest for policy advice.
Moreover, monetary authorities might be interested in the scope that is left for inﬂuencing
domestic interest rates given the extent of FX volatility they are willing to tolerate.
Topreviewtheempiricalresultsofthiswork, weconﬁrm theimplicationsofthetrilemma
to hold throughout. Monetary autonomy appears completely lost for economies that feature
low FX rate ﬂexibility and high capital mobility, while economies with rather immobile
capital and ﬂexible FX rates are least affected by interest rate transmission. For the latter,
however, transmission still appears to be quite high. Formally testing the implications of the
macroeconomic trilemma, we strongly reject invariance of interest rate transmission with re-
spect to capital mobility and FX rate ﬂexibility for all provided semiparametric model speci-
ﬁcations. Moreover, we provide evidence that ignoring the impact of domestic fundamentals
leads to upward biased estimates of interest rate transmission especially for more ﬂexible
regimes. Thus, former evidence suggesting that ﬂoating implies only moderate advantages
in monetary independence might arise from omitted variable biases.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: In the subsequent section, we in-
troduce our empirical model, which, in a ﬁrst step, is estimated by means of conventional
parametric panel models allowing for ﬁxed effects and country speciﬁc interest rate rules. In
section 3 we explain how the model is implemented in the functional coefﬁcient framework
and motivate the employed state variables. In section 4 we provide semiparametric estima-
tion results, discuss the ﬁndings and implications for monetary policy. Section 5 concludes.
Technical detailsabout estimationand inference in semiparametricmodels, as well as several
robustness analyses are given in the appendix.
2 Monetary independence - benchmark approaches
As a starting point, we formalize interest rate transmission in a conventional (parametric)
framework to obtain a (descriptive) assessment of data inherent features that allows a mean-
ingfulcomparisonwith conclusionsavailablefrom theliterature. Firstly, theempiricalmodel
is introduced, followed by a brief description of the regime classiﬁcation procedures applied
to measures of FX variability and capital mobility. After providing some information on
the data set, parametric ﬁxed effects panel regressions for each regime are conducted and
empirical (benchmark) results are discussed.
42.1 Single country regressions
The implications of FX stability on monetary dependence have been investigated by com-
paring instantaneous transmission of interest rates across different FX regimes. Frankel et
al. (2004) use monthly interest rate levels and unbalanced panel models with ﬁxed effects,
while Shambaugh (2004) considers ﬁrst differences in yearly interest rates and pooled model
estimation instead. We generalize the panel model in Shambaugh (2004) by additionally
considering domestic fundamentals and a ’pseudo error correction term’ that allows for long
term adjustments to a time varying steady state. In line with Shambaugh (2004), the analysis
builds on lower frequency data to minimize problems associated with heterogeneous time
lags in short term adjustment dynamics. For given presample values consider single country
regression models of the following form:
Δrit = αi1Δrjt + αi2(rit−1 − rjt−1 − φ
hp
ijt−1)+βi0 + βi1 πit−1 + βi2 qit−1 + βi3 sijt−1 + eit,




itβi + eit,t =1 ,...,T, i=1 ,...,N, (1)
where the time and cross section dimension of the sample are denoted as T and N, respec-
tively, x 
it =[ Δ rjt, (rit−1 − rjt−1 − φ
hp
ijt−1)] and z 
it =[ 1 ,  πit−1,  qit−1,  sijt−1]. Speciﬁcally,
rit is the (quarterly) short term domestic market interest rate in country i, φ
hp
ijt−1 is the steady
state interest rate differential between country i and reference country j obtained by HP ﬁl-
tering of the nominal interest rate differential rit−1 − rjt−1. For benchmarking purposes, we
use either German or US interest rates, where the German rate is the reference for all Eu-
ropean countries (except Germany and the UK), and the US rate is considered for all other
economies (including Germany and the UK). This choice reﬂects the commonly held view
that mostEuropean interest rates are predominantlysubjected to German interest rates, while
the US monetary policy tends to dominate world interest rates (Katsimbris and Miller, 1993,
Kirchgässner and Wolters, 1993, Hassapis, Pittis and Prodromidis 1999). Turning to do-
mestic fundamentals, the deviations from the steady states of domestic inﬂation, output and
exchange rates are given by  πit−1,  qit−1 and  sijt−1. Throughout, HP implied steady states are
recursively evaluated (and therefore ’observable’)2 . As suggested by Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) we use a smoothing parameter of λ = 1600 for quarterly data. For exact deﬁnitions
of the variables see table 1.
2To guarantee sensible HP gaps at the beginning of the sample (1987Q1) we use presample information,
i.e. a gap in t is derived by ﬁltering data for the subperiod t∗,...,t,w h e r et∗ << 1987Q1.
5Obviously, the speciﬁcation in (1) is similar to an error correction model restricted to
a long run interest rate parity that holds up to an additional time varying intercept φ
hp
ijt−1
which is determined outside the model. In the framework of the uncovered interest rate
parity, φ
hp
ijt−1 should reﬂect steady states of i) expected FX rate changes as e.g. implied by
differences in (expected) inﬂation rates or ii) persistent risk premia. We choose a ﬂexible
local steady state since risk premia and cross country spreads in inﬂation expectations may
trend in a persistent manner. Hence, imposing conventional deterministic terms such as an
intercept or a time trend to enter a cointegrating relation might not be appropriate. Moreover,
regression (1) is not subjected to inferential issues associated with nonstationary (and even-
tually not cointegrated) variables, since deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁltered
interest rate differential are stationary by construction. Lastly, accounting for domestic fun-
damentals such as the HP-implied inﬂation, output and exchange rate gap, model (1) rules
out spurious evidence on monetary dependence that could be induced by real economic link-
ages. Notably,  πit−1,  qit−1 and  sijt−1 likely constitute important targets or side conditions
of monetary policy. According to the model in (1), monetary independence implies that an
economy is able to maintain isolated interest rate adjustmentsfrom a givenequilibriuminter-
est rate differential (as it is implied by HP trends) to inﬂuence output or inﬂation. Thus, the
impact of international transmission (parameterized by αi1 and αi2) on the domestic interest
rate should be insigniﬁcant or at least small in absolute terms. Moreover, the response of
local interest rates to domestic fundamentals (parameterized by βi1,β i2 and βi3) should be
(signiﬁcantly) positive3 . However, a positive parameter estimate ˆ βi3 might reﬂect that mon-
etary authorities adjust domestic interest rates in order to stabilize FX rates, and thus, their
policy is not independent in a stricter sense. In turn, loss of autonomy occurs if αi1 (or αi2)
are estimated signiﬁcantly positive (negative) and large in absolute value. Moreover, under
high exposure to foreign interest rates, estimates of βi1,β i2 and βi3 should be insigniﬁcant
since, in such a setting, monetary authorities likely fail to adjust interest rates with respect
to domestic goals. For our purposes, however, the main emphasis lies on transmission pa-
rameters αi1 and αi2 since insigniﬁcance of parameters βi1,β i1 and βi3 might also signal that
countries do not (try to) pursue Taylor-type policy rules. For instance, temporary currency
crises, the termination of the great moderation process or the necessity to fulﬁll stability
criteria during the pre Euro era have been likely accompanied by substantial violations of
conventional policy rules. Consequently, we control for (time invariant) country speciﬁc do-
3Note that FX rates are deﬁned in direct quotation
6mestic policy rules but discuss associated (unconditional) parameter estimates rather brieﬂy.
Partialling out zit from (1) yields
ˇ yit = ˇ x
 
itαi +ˇ eit, (2)
where ˇ yi = Miyi, ˇ xi = Mixi, ˇ ei = Miei and Mi =( Ii − zi(z 
izi)−1z 
i),w i t hzi =
[zi1,...,ziT] . For panel estimation of equation (2), we allow that interest rate transmis-
sion parameters α1 and α2 vary according to observable heterogeneity measured in terms of
FX rate ﬂexibility and capital market integration over countries i and for time t. Different
assumptions concerning the pattern of heterogeneity give rise to both conventional panel re-
gressions with ﬁxed effects and country speciﬁc policy rules (sections 2.2 and 2.4) as well as
more ﬂexible semiparametric functional coefﬁcient panel regressions (section 3).
2.2 State deﬁnitions and panel estimation
Let observable country speciﬁc FX variability  ψ
fx
it and capital (im)mobility  ψ
cap








2 and  ψ
cap
it =( ρit−1 − ρjt−1)
2, (3)
respectively, where sij,m is the monthly price for one unit of reference currency j in terms of
domestic currency i and ρit − ρjt is the quarterly real interest rate differential. Speciﬁcally,
ρit = rit − πe
it is deﬁned as the three month nominal interest rate rit d e ﬂ a t e db yt h et h r e e
month expected rate of inﬂation πe
it in time t. To avoid endogeneity issues we throughout ap-
proximateπe
it by annualized realized consumerprice inﬂation, πe
it ≈ ln(CPIit)−ln(CPIit−4),
implicitly assuming static instead of rational expectations. The FX rate regime in country i
at time t is classiﬁed as relatively ’ﬂexible’ (’inﬂexible’) if the current FX volatility is be-
low (above) the corresponding global i.e. cross sectional median4 , Med( ψ
fx
t ). Moreover, to
capture potential strengthening of capital market integration over time, it is distinguished if
the capital mobility in time t is below or above the country speciﬁc median reference level5
, Med( ψ
cap
i ). Formally, we have
4It has been argued (Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005) that FX volatility might not only reﬂect FX ﬂexibility,
but also common exposure to shocks. It is noteworthy that deﬁning FX volatility with respect to a global
volatility benchmark might reduce this effect to some extent.
5Note that an evaluation with respect to the cross sectional median of capital mobility Med( ψ
cap
t ) would







it if  ψ
fx












it if  ψ
cap






Following the panel approach of Shambaugh (2004), we conduct regime speciﬁc pooled
estimates of model (2) giving rise to the speciﬁcation
ˇ yit = ˇ x
 
itα +  it, ∀{i,t}∈( ψ
cap,•,  ψ
fx,◦), (4)
where •,◦∈{ l,h}. Panel model (4) implicitly includes country speciﬁc ﬁxed effects ac-
counting e.g. for long term moderation processes. To benchmark our model with alternative
speciﬁcations that have been used earlier in this context, we complementary apply a classiﬁ-
cation scheme similar to that in Shambaugh (2004), where a country i in quarter t is labeled
’peg’ if its (monthly) exchange rate has been within 2% bands over the last 12 months.
To measure capital mobility, Shambaugh (2004) considered (non)existence of capital barri-
ers. Since capital markets had been liberalized over the vast majority of ’small’ developed
economies until 1987, we do not take capital controls explicitly into account.
2.3 Data and variable deﬁnition
This study builds on quarterly cross sectional data for the time period 1987q1-2008q3 for 20
’small’ economies, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singa-
pore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The choice is motivated by data availability.
Outlying observations quoted in the context of international crises (e.g. European currency
crisis 1992/1993, the Asian ﬁnancial crisis 1997) are excluded from the sample as well as
quotes related to excessive interest rate volatility. In particular, strong ﬂuctuations in South
Korean interest rates observed before 1999 completely dominated sample information and
therefore rendered panel coefﬁcient estimates hardly representative. Interest rates are three
month money market rates, or, if not available, three month treasury bill rates. Spot FX rates
are throughout determined in direct quotation. To measure inﬂation we use annualized CPI
inﬂation. Annualized real growth of outputis approximated by means of GDP data whenever
possible. If corresponding time series are not available, annualized real growth of industrial
production is used instead. Table 1 provides more detailed information about data sources,
variable deﬁnitions and removed observations.
8[Insert table 1 about here!]
2.4 Results
Table 2 reports panel estimates for the model in equation (2) according to distinct regimes of
FX ﬂexibility and capital mobility.
[Insert table 2 about here!]
As implied by a parameter estimateof ˆ α1 =0 .81, changes in world interest ratesΔrjt are
almost instantaneously reﬂected in interest rate changes of corresponding partner economies
given that exchange rate volatility is low ( ψfx,l) and capital mobility is high ( ψcap,h).I n -
tegrated economies with low FX rate variation are therefore hardly able to adapt domestic
interest rates in response to their individual positions over the business cycle. Short run
transmission to economies with low FX ﬂexibility but less mobile capital ( ψfx,l,  ψcap,l) is
weaker (ˆ α1 =0 .65). At a nominal level of 5%, we do not diagnose signiﬁcance of error
correction dynamics ˆ α2 for these two regimes. Evidence in the subsequent chapter suggests
considerable parameter heterogeneity to prevail within both groups. Consequently, the pa-
rameter heterogeneity not taken into account by this panel regressions appears to increase
estimation uncertainty and results in imprecise panel estimates. Economies characterized
by higher variation of FX rates and rather mobile capital ( ψfx,h,  ψcap,h) are less subjected to
international transmission of interest rate changes (ˆ α1 =0 .45) while adjustment dynamics
ˆ α2 towards the steady state equilibrium are insigniﬁcant. Lastly, economies with low capital
mobility and rather ﬂexible FX rates ( ψfx,h,  ψcap,l) are least affected by interest rate transmis-
sion (ˆ α1 =0 .34).
Turning to estimates based on a similar classiﬁcation as in Shambaugh (2004), pegs are
characterized by high transmission of interest rate changes ˆ α1 =0 .83, while also adjustment
dynamics ˆ α2 = −0.13 are negative with 5% signiﬁcance. By contrast, contemporaneous
transmission of nonpegs’ interest rate changes is weaker (ˆ α1 =0 .45) and adjustment dy-
namics are insigniﬁcant. The counterpart estimates for ˆ α1 in Shambaugh (2004, p.325) are
0.79 for pegs and 0.55 for nonpegs under absence of capital controls. However, compar-
ing this evidence to our results is only justiﬁed if observed correlation of interest rates fully
reﬂects monetary dependence. Therefore, it is of immediate interest if an exclusion of con-
trol variables  πit−1,  qit−1 and  sijt−1 from (1) yields (upward) biased estimates of monetary
9dependence especially for more ﬂexible regimes under synchronized business cycles. To




jt + θ2(rit−1 − rjt−1 − φ
hp
ijt−1)
  +˜ eit,




 θ +˜ eit, ∀{i,t}∈( ψ
cap,•,  ψ
fx,◦), (5)
where e.g. y 
it ≡ yit − ¯ yi with ¯ yi denoting the sample mean of yit. Table 2 provides regime
speciﬁc estimates for panel model (5). Overall, ignoring the impact of domestic fundamen-
tals appears to have two distinct effects. On the one hand interest rate transmission seems
strongly upward biased for economies that are presumed most independent ( ψfx,h,  ψcap,l or
’nonpegs’), since estimates ˆ θ1 exceed corresponding quantities ˆ α1 up to ˆ θ1 − ˆ α1 =0 .11.
In turn, there is hardly any difference between ˆ θ1 and ˆ α1 for economies that should suffer
from loss of monetary autonomy ( ψfx,l,  ψcap,h or ’pegs’). These ﬁndings underline the argu-
ment that interest rates of (presumably) more independent economies should ceteris paribus
incorporate more information about domestic fundamentals. Interestingly, estimated inter-
est rate transmission obtained under absence of control variables for the group of nonpegs
(ˆ θ1 =0 .54) is very close to the corresponding estimate of 0.55 in Shambaugh (2004). This
might be a hint that the lack of control variables in former studies implies an understatement
of independence especially for more ﬂexible FX regimes. On the other hand, somewhat
’odd’ parameter estimates ˆ θ2 are more reasonable after controlling for domestic policy rules.
As already suspected by Frankel et al. (2004) and Shambaugh (2004), our empirical ﬁnd-
ings support an economically signiﬁcant share of common movements in interest rates to
reﬂect synchronized business cycle behavior. Thus, evaluating monetary dependence merely
in terms of interest rate comovement might not be fully appropriate. Moreover, the "Fear
of Floating" phenomenon implying comovements in interest rates under de jure ﬂexible FX
rates could be less relevant if one adequately controls for domestic policy rules and real
economic linkages.
Unconditional (i.e. state invariant) country speciﬁc policy parameter estimates obtained
from the regression in (1) are given in table 3.
[Insert table 3 about here!]
Under the assumption that monetary authorities set interest rates in reﬂection of ﬂuc-
tuations in output and/or inﬂation rates, we see that, in line with Frankel et al. (2004),
10especially Germany and Japan are able to target domestic goals. By contrast to Frankel et al.
(2004), thereisalsoevidencethatsomesmallercountriescharacterized byhighFX ﬂexibility
(New Zealand) and even economies with intermediate to low FX variation (Netherlands and
Switzerland) might be capable to target domestic output and/or inﬂation. Moreover, signif-
icant but counterintuitive policy parameter estimates ˆ βi1 are diagnosed for South Korea and
Italy. Rather tautological, countries with minor FX ﬂexibility such as Belgium, Denmark,
France, Italy and Sweden are ’autonomous’ in the sense that they seem to have adjusted do-
mestic interest rates to attenuate ﬂuctuations in the valuation of their currencies over longer
time horizons. By contrast, insigniﬁcant policy response parameter estimates ˆ βi1, ˆ βi2 that
prevail for most of these countries suggest that inﬂation and output targets cannot be ad-
dressed properly. Hence, by adjusting interest rates according to an (intermediate) FX target,
it appears if these economies lose their ability to directly address inﬂation and output targets
via interest rates.
Concerning panel estimation of interest rate transmission, overly general classiﬁcations
as used in this section might not be fully appropriate due to within group parameter het-
erogeneity. Moreover, such classiﬁcations are of limited applicability for policy advice since
each economymighthaveitsindividualpreference withregard to an acceptable degreeof FX
rate variation. The requirement for a thorough differentiation among states of FX ﬂexibility
motivates an assessment based on continuous functional coefﬁcient panel models.
3 Functional coefﬁcient panel models
In theory, the macroeconomic trilemma formalizes that the exposure of small economies’
interest rates to world market rates should exhibit a continuous relation to its factual FX
ﬂexibility and the state of capital mobility. In the spirit of the functional model in Herwartz
and Xu (2009) consider a semiparametric extension of (2)
ˇ yit = ˇ x
 
itα(ω)+uit,α (ω)=( α1(ω),α 2(ω)), (6)
where ˇ yit,ˇ xit are obtained from thepartial regressionin (2). The speciﬁcation in (6) is a local
model for interest rate transmission dynamics in the sense that its parameters α(ω) depend
on a representative continuum of states ω that, for instance, summarize i) country speciﬁc
exchange rate variability (discussed in section 3.1), or ii) both country speciﬁc exchange rate
11variability and capital mobility (section 3.2). Semiparametric functional coefﬁcient estima-
tors are subjected to the curse of (factor) dimensionality. With respect to subsequent choices
of factor variables, note that the factor dimension will not exceed 2 given the available sam-
plesize of quarterly observations. Technical details on estimationand inference in functional
coefﬁcient models are given in appendix A and appendix B, respectively.
3.1 Dynamic state deﬁnitions: FX ﬂexibility
For the moment assume that, during the last two decades, capital has been sufﬁciently and
uniformly mobile such that the ability of small developed economies to inﬂuence domestic
interestrates hasbeen predominantlydeterminedbytheﬂexibilityofFX rates. Letψ
fx
it denote
the logarithmic realized exchange rate volatility in economy i over the last quarter6 ,i . e .
ψ
fx









where sij,m is the price of benchmark currency j in terms of domestic currency i in month
m. In the following, all state variables (or factors, henceforth) are given in standardized form
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be a measure of FX variability that characterizes the time path of (standardized) realized FX
volatility for a given country. To contrast the state of FX ﬂexibility for an economy in time t
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t )2.
Finally, let ω =( ω(1),ω(2))  summarize the observable states of country speciﬁc exchange
rate ﬂexibility. For illustrational puposes, ﬁgure (1) sketches time paths of observed states
6Taking logs improves the distributional features of realized volatilities which tend to be strongly skewed
to the left. Since, especially for the EMU members, FX volatilities may become zero, we add a small constant





it for Austria, Switzerland and Japan which may be seen to represent economies
with unconditionally low, intermediate and high FX ﬂexibility. Obviously, with respect to
country speciﬁc variability over time and measured against other economies, we diagnose
state dependence in both directions.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 about here!]
For example, the Swiss Franc is characterized by an increase in FX rate volatility ω
(1)
it
after 1999. Moreover, this increase led to a reclassiﬁcation (due to ω
(2)
it ) in the sense that
the Swiss Franc moved from a low FX volatility regime to more ﬂexible states compared
with other currencies. Notably, a high realization ω
(1)
it does not necessarily imply ﬂexible
FX rates. It rather measures if an economy is characterized by a relatively high FX variation
compared with its own historical experience. Accordingly, a high ω
(1)
it in combination with
al o wω
(2)
it might reﬂect that a pegging economy has difﬁculties to maintain the peg.




it are shown in the upper panel of ﬁgure 2. The
apparent peaks featuring FX based factors reﬂect quotes belonging to EMU members after
the introduction of the Euro. Since intra EMU FX rates have been ﬁxed since then, FX
volatilities of all EMU countries were zero, implying a high concentration of observations in
thecorrespondingareaoftheempiricalsupport. NotethatthoughthelatterFX volatilitiesare
zero, there are someobservations falling belowEMU impliedstate measures, which is due to
the cross sectional standardization. In appendix C, additional empirical results are provided
for a subsample 1987Q1-1998Q12 to show that quotes associated with the EMU are not
decisive for our quantitativeassessment of the macroeconomic trilemma and its implications
for monetary dependence.
[Insert ﬁgure 2 about here!]
3.2 Dynamic state deﬁnitions: The macroeconomic trilemma
The macroeconomic trilemma suggests that monetary autonomy is lost if capital is fully
mobile and exchange rates are stable. Hence, in addition to measures of FX rate stability,
(country speciﬁc) measures of capital mobility should be taken into account explicitly as
determinants of monetary dependence. We rely on ω
(2)
it (i.e. cross sectionally evaluated FX
volatility) for measuring FX variation. Capital mobility and capital market globalization has
often been approximated by the extent of international real interest rate equalization (e.g.
13Mishkin 1984, Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). Let ψin
it denote the logarithmic7 absolute real
interestrate differentialbetween economyi and benchmark countryj prevailingintimet−1.
Formally, ψin
it =l n ( |ρit−1 − ρjt−1|). We deﬁne real interest rates ρit as before in section 2.2.
Moreover, real interest rate differentials enter in lagged form to avoid endogeneity problems.
Summarizing country speciﬁc time paths of capital mobility over the last 20 years, a state
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i )2.
Since this choice for time speciﬁc features leaves cross sectional speciﬁc characteristics un-
considered, we additionally provide results using a state variable that subsumes both cross
sectional and time speciﬁc features of real interest rate convergence in the appendix. Finally,
let ω =( ω(2),ω(3))  summarize states of exchange rate stability and country speciﬁc capi-
tal market integration. Dynamic and unconditional characteristics of the estimated states of
capital market integration are displayed in ﬁgures 1 and 2, respectively.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Monetary independence as a function of FX rate ﬂexibility
Figure 3 displays parameter estimates for the two-factor functional coefﬁcient model ob-
tained over a representative continuum of states measuring exchange rate ﬂexibility deﬁned
in section 3.1. At ﬁrst, one observes that, quantiﬁed by ˆ α1(ω) and ˆ α2(ω), international trans-
mission decreases over states of relatively high FX variation. Accordingly, results for global
tests for factor invariance of transmission dynamics given in table 4 suggest this functional
relationship to be globally signiﬁcant.
[Insert ﬁgure 3 about here!]
[Insert table 4 about here!]
Locally, ﬁgure 3 shows that economies which are characterized by a low realized FX
volatility in comparison with other economies suffer from the highest contemporaneous
7Similar to section 3.1, we add a small constant and take logs to reduce the skewness of the factor distribu-
tion.
14transmission ˆ α1(ω) of reference nominal interest rates. Given that a currency is in a state
of relatively low country speciﬁc FX variability (i.e. ω(1) ≈− 1), and, moreover, this vari-
ation is rather small with respect to the other currencies in the sample (e.g. ω(2) ≈− 1),
monthly contemporaneous interest rate transmission ˆ α1(ω)=0 .9 is close to unity, implying
almost full transmission of world interest rates. In turn, economies with relatively high re-
alized FX volatility (ω(2) ≈ 1) are less severely subjected to contemporaneous interest rate
transmission varying between ˆ α1(ω)=0 .4 and ˆ α1(ω)=0 .5. Since corresponding local
conﬁdence intervals do not include zero transmission α1(ω)=0 , we reject interest rate au-
tonomy for small economies with rather ﬂexible FX rates. Generally, state dependence of
ˆ α1(ω) is locally signiﬁcant, since estimates often go beyond bootstrap based 95% conﬁdence
intervals which are derived under the assumption of state invariance (see appendix A). For
example, given that country speciﬁc FX variation is close to its historic average (ω(1) ≈ 0),
we observe transmission parameter estimates below conﬁdence intervals if corresponding
FX variation exceeds the global mean (ω(2) ≥ 0). In turn, functional transmission estimates
are above conﬁdence bounds if observed FX variation falls short of ω(2) ≤− 0.5.
Measuring the adjustment speed towards a steady state nominal interest rate differential,
we observe two state speciﬁc characteristics for ˆ α2(ω). Firstly, nominal interest rates adjust
(signiﬁcantly) faster when exchange rate volatility is relatively low in comparison with the
cross sectional average level of FX rate volatility (ω(2) ≈− 1). Moreover, if the domestic
currency features higher variability than most other currencies (e.g. ω(2) ≈ 1), parameter
estimates are close to or even above zero which means that domestic rates do not adjust to
the steady state. In line with adjustment parameter estimates from conventional paramet-
ric panel models in section 2.4, state invariance implied local conﬁdence intervals include
ˆ α1(ω)=0 . By contrast, highlighting the merits of local estimation, state dependent es-
timates are often not included in the interval. For all levels of country speciﬁc variation,
the speed of adjustment signiﬁcantly increases in the cross sectional measure of FX stabil-
ity ω(2). For low values of ω(2), ˆ α2(ω) approaches −0.2, implying a half life of deviations
from steady state interest differentials of approximately three quarters. Secondly, we observe
that the adjustment speed also signiﬁcantly increases in ω(1), with fastest estimated adjust-
ment diagnosed conditional on states of high country speciﬁc volatilities ω(1) and relatively
low states ω(2). This observation might reﬂect scenarios in which the stability of (pegged)
currencies is threatened by speculativemarket forces. By reducing the monetary base, mone-
tary authorities might then rise interest rates so markedly that speculators refrain from going
15short in the domestic currency (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Such (short lived) peaks might
tend to dominate the estimated adjustment of interest rates locally for states characterized by
{ω(1) > 1,ω(2) < −1}.
3.3.2 Monetary independence implied by the macroeconomic trilemma
Figure 4 shows parameter estimates for the two-factor functional coefﬁcient model obtained
over different (i.e. representative) states summarizing FX variability (ω(2)) and capital mar-
ket integration (ω(3)) as deﬁned in section 3.2. Reﬁning the overall evidence from parametric
panel based evidence in section 2.4, functional estimates ˆ α1(ω) and ˆ α2(ω) suggest a marked
trade-off among FX stability, capital mobility and monetary independence. Hence, the im-
plicationsof themacroeconomictrilemmaseem to hold throughoutfor developedeconomies
over the last two decades.
[Insert ﬁgure 4 about here!]
Conﬁrming this overall impression formally, we reject global factor invariance of trans-
mission dynamics at conventional signiﬁcance levels according to test results in table 4.
Moreover, observed transmission depends on both capital mobility and FX ﬂexibility since
partial factor invariance is rejected throughout. Thus, the extent of FX ﬂexibility and capital
market integration matters for interest rate transmission in general. Locally, ﬁgure 4 shows
estimated contemporaneous interest rate transmission ˆ α1(ω) to increase with exchange rate
stabilityand capital market integration(notethat highvalues ofω(3) indicatestates of relative
market disintegration). States of rather low FX rate volatility and high capital mobility are
characterized by contemporaneous transmission estimates ˆ α1(ω) close to unity that steadily
decay to ˆ α1(ω)=0 .6 if capital mobility decreases (ceteris paribus). In turn, if FX ﬂexibility
(i.e. ω(2)) increases, estimated transmission quickly drops to values close to ˆ α1(ω)=0 .4.
Overall, it appears that a higher share of coefﬁcient variation is caused by FX ﬂexibility in
comparison with capital mobility induced variation. This seems intuitive since free ﬂow of
capital had been already established for the period under investigation. Local conﬁdence in-
tervals underline that states of high FX ﬂexibility (low capital mobility) are characterized by
local state invariance of capital mobility (FX ﬂexibility). Hence, under relatively immobile
capital (ﬂexible FX rates), interest rate transmission is not subjected to FX stability (capital
mobility) any longer. However, conﬁdence bands never include ˆ α1(ω)=0and thus, full
independence might not prevail for small economies even under high FX ﬂexibility and/or
16low capital mobility. Accordingly, the predictions of the macroeconomic trilemma most
likely hold in a ’relative’ form. Similar to the evidence in ﬁgure 3, it seems that interest
rate transmission rises if ω(2) falls below a certain threshold value ω(2) ≈ 0. Therefore, an
economy with high FX ﬂexibility might stabilize its currency to a certain extent without suf-
fering from an increasing exposure to changes in foreign interest rates. Functional estimates
ˆ α2(ω) reveal that the adjustment of domestic interest rates to their steady state differential
tends to be the faster the less ﬂexible are corresponding FX rates. Again, parameter varia-
tion seems to be predominantly governed by states of FX ﬂexibility ω(2), while (in line with
evidence based on parametric models) we also diagnose higher adjustment speed in states
of lower capital market integration. Since market integration is measured by means of the
real interest rate differential, relatively high capital market disintegration coupled with rela-
tively low FX variability implies raised currency risk premia for a given economy. To some
extent, this state (and corresponding local adjustment parameter estimates) should coincide
with the case where (target) FX rates are threatened by speculative market forces discussed
in section 3.3.1. By contrast to the local behavior of ˆ α1(ω), we ﬁnd that the foreign inﬂuence
on domestic rates in terms of ˆ α2(ω) increases whenever FX rate volatility decreases. Thus,
even stabilizing the domestic currency moderately might be accompanied by a stronger ad-
justment to the steady state interest rate differential. Also reﬂecting empirical results from
section 3.3.1, we conclude that free ﬂoating economies might moderately attenuate FX rate
movements without substantially increasing their exposure to foreign interest rates. How-
ever, economies with average FX rate ﬂexibility substantially forfeit remaining degrees of
freedom of domestic monetary policy by further decreasing ﬂexibility.
4 Conclusions
The macroeconomic trilemma suggests a bindingtrade-off among three fundamental aims of
monetary authorities: To beneﬁt from full capital mobility, to minimize variation in FX rates
and to be able to conduct an independent monetary policy targeting at domestic goals. Since
presumed gains in monetary autonomy are the main motivation to accept some variation in
FX rates, a comprehensive assessment of this trade-off is a core prerequisite for monetary
policymakers’ decisions on the appropriate extent of FX rate ﬂexibility. In this study we
put particular effort on providing an extensive empirical assessment of the macroeconomic
trilemma and its implications for monetary independence of developed economies by means
17of a ﬂexible and unique econometric panel framework.
Evidence from conventional parametric panel models indicates that, in line with Sham-
baugh (2004) and by contrast to Frankel et al. (2004), interest rates of more ﬂexible currency
regimes are less subjected to exposure to foreign interest rates. Moreover, we argue that
former evidence might have suffered from biased transmission estimates due to the lack of
control variables ruling out the effects of synchronized business cycle behavior. Flexible
semiparametric panel model estimates and corresponding tests strongly support the general
validity of the macroeconomic trilemma, where transmission seems to be a positive (non-
linear) function of FX rate stability and capital mobility. Countries with ﬁxed FX rates and
closely integrated capital markets share one-to-one interest rate movements with their refer-
ence economies, while states that are either characterized by higher FX variation or lower
capital mobility(or both) feature markedly less transmission. However, as interest rate trans-
mission does not appear to linearly increase in FX rate ﬂexibility and capital mobility, there
is some scope for attenuating FX rate ﬂuctuations at little cost, since (at least for more ﬂex-
ible regimes) marginal decreases in FX rate ﬂexibility do not necessarily imply a marked
strengthening of transmission. Accordingly, gains in monetary independence are substantial
if a country abdicates pegging its FX rate, but the marginal beneﬁt of tolerating higher FX
ﬂexibility quickly vanishes. Lastly, this study focuses on monetary dependence of developed
economies. Besides data availability problems, developing economies are not considered
since they deserve a different (separate) treatment with respect to their excessively volatile
interest rate characteristics, risk premia and choice of domestic fundamentals. Studying de-
terminants of monetary autonomy for developing countries in a modiﬁed (semiparametric)
model is considered as an issue for future research.
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20Appendix A
Estimation and Inference
Estimation of the functional coefﬁcient vector α(ω) is implemented as a multivariateversion
of the Nadaraya Watson estimator (Nadaraya, 1964; Watson, 1964). The estimator is deﬁned
as ˆ α(ω)=X −1(ω)Y(ω)and maybe seen as a pooledweighted least squares estimatorwhere
observations ωit close to ω enter with higher weights than observations ωit deviating more
































where{(p,q)}∈{ (1,2);(2,3)}. Moreover, Kh(•)=1
hK(•
h) andK denotes aquartickernel
function, i.e. K(u)=15
16(1−u2)2I(|u|≤1). For bandwidth selection, we use Scott’s rule of
thumb (Scott 1992), multiplied by a factor of 1.8. Smaller bandwidths turn out to eventually
result in numerical problems that occur in regions of very sparse data involving singularity
of local regression design matrices.
Local inference on α(ω) is based on bootstrap-based conﬁdence intervals for parame-
ters associated with international interest rate transmission α1(ω),α 2(ω). To infer if func-
tionalcoefﬁcient estimatesare locally statedependent, thefollowingfactor based resampling
scheme has been proposed by Herwartz and Xu (2009):
1. Local parameter estimates for model (6) can be considered as a function of the data
and the chosen bandwidth parameter, i.e.
ˆ αi(ω)=f(ˇ yit,ˇ x
 




it ),h,i=1 ,...,N,t=1 ,...,T). (7)
2. Factor dependence and invariance of coefﬁcients in model (7) are distinguished by a
























t=1. Note that sample information on ˇ yit,ˇ x 
it is not
affected by the bootstrap. Therefore, the proposed scheme will generate a factor vari-
able that, per construction, is independent of the functional coefﬁcients. If the null hy-
pothesis of state invariance is true, estimates ˆ α(ω) and ˆ α∗(ω) should only marginally
deviate from each other if evaluated over the support of the factor variable.
3. A large number of draws, R = 1000 say, of bootstrap estimates ˆ α∗(ω) is considered
as sufﬁcient to approximate the underlying distribution under the null hypothesis of
state invariance. For inferential purposes, estimates ˆ α(ω) are shown with conﬁdence
intervals that present the 25th and 975th order statistic of ˆ α∗(ω). In this sense, the
actual estimate is regarded to differ locally from the unconditional relation with 5%
signiﬁcance if the local conﬁdence interval does not include the local estimate ˆ α(ω).
Local inference by means of conﬁdence intervals is informative to characterize functional
relationships conditional on speciﬁc economic states ω. The same factor based resampling
scheme applies to test for ’overall’ factor dependence of interest rate transmissionα1(ω) and
long term adjustment α2(ω). For this purpose we consider the residual sum of squares (RSS)
of the functional regression
ˇ yit = ˇ x
 
itα(ω)+uit.
The null hypothesis of overall factor invariance, H0 : α(ω)=α is rejected with 5% sig-
niﬁcance if the sample based RSS statistic exceeds the 95% quantile of the respective dis-
tribution of bootstrap based counterparts. Notably, the introduced factor resampling scheme
applies for testing the hypothesis of global joint factor invariance. To test for partial factor
invariance, we draw with replacement from one factor only, while letting the other factor
(and thus its potential link to the data) unchanged.
22Appendix B
Robustness of empirical results
B.1 Using an exchange rate band based factor variable
One natural alternative to approximate FX ﬂexibility is to use the realized size of (hypothet-
ical) FX bands. Deﬁne
ψ
fxb
it =l n ( m a x ( |ln(sij,m) − ln(sij,z)|)), ∀m ∈ z;z = {t − 1,...,t− 4},
where sij,z denotes the median FX rate (i.e. the presumed target value) that prevailed over
the last twelve months. Moreover, max(|ln(sij,m) − ln(sij,z)|) is the corresponding max-
imum percentaged absolute deviation from sij,z which is considered in logs to reduce the
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cross sectional dispersion.
Functional parameter estimates in the upper panel of ﬁgure 5 suggest that the overall
result remains robust when substituting realized FX volatility with the realized width of a
presumed FX band.
B.2 Using a different measure for capital mobility
In section 3.2 we argued that our choice of a time speciﬁc measure for capital mobility
ω
(3)
it leaves cross sectional speciﬁc characteristics unconsidered. As a robustness check, we
additionally provide estimation results based on an alternative state variable that subsumes





it − ¯ ψ
capb)/σ(ψ
capb),





















it − ¯ ψcapb)2.
Eyeballing the medium panel in ﬁgure 5 reveals similar basic empirical functional patterns
of α1 and α2 a sd i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n4 .
23B.3 Excluding the EMU period
One might conjecture that observed functional characteristics in ﬁgure 4 just reﬂect two
states implied by EMU and non-EMU observations. Hence, we additionally provide esti-
mates for a subsample of panel data excludingthe EMU era to show that these quotes are not
decisive for our conclusions. Interest rate transmission estimates conditional on (ω(2),ω(3))
for the subsample 1987Q1 − 1998Q4 are given in the lower panel of ﬁgure 5. At ﬁrst sight,
the same basic conclusions can be drawn for the substantially smaller data set that excludes
quotes on EMU and non-EMU economies after 1998Q4. Most importantly, local estimates
that might be presumed to predominantly reﬂect observed transmission patterns within the
EMU (i.e. ˆ α1 ≈ 1 and ˆ α2 ≤− 0.2 located in states of high capital mobility and low FX ﬂex-
ibility) hardly change after excluding the most recent decade. In comparison with the full
sample estimate, however, subsample based transmission estimates ˆ α1 seem locally stronger
in states of low to medium capital mobility and high FX variability. Though global factor
invariance in general is rejected, this less clear cut pattern of factor dependence for ˆ α1 is re-
ﬂected in the p−value 0.13 for testing partial (FX implied) global state invariance provided
in table 4. In fact, however, this ﬁnding reﬂects more the exclusion of non-EMU economies
after 1999 since solely discarding EMU observations yields results very close to full sample
based evidence in ﬁgure 4 and table 4.
24Table 1: Variable deﬁnitions, data sources and removed observations
Variable Deﬁnition Source Removed Observations
rit 3 Month MM/TB Rate IFS Bel 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
πit,πe
it ln(CPIit) − ln(CPIit−4) IFS Den 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
qit ln(GDPit) − ln(GDPit−4) − πit Datastream FR 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
ln(IPit) − ln(IPit−4) − πit Datastream IT 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
sij Price currency i/ Price currency j Datastream Ko 1987Q1-1999Q1+
ρit rit − πit - Nor 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
˜ πit πit − HP(πit,λ= 1600|It) - NZ 1987Q1-1988Q3+
˜ qit qit − HP(qit,λ= 1600|It) - Swe 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
˜ sij,t sij,t − HP(sij,t,λ= 1600|It) - Fin 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
φ
hp
ij,t rit − rjt − HP(rit − rjt,λ= 1600|It) - Ir 1992Q2-1993Q4∗
Variable deﬁnitions and sources are given in the left panel of table 1. In particular, the notion
HP(qit,λ = 1600|It) refers to the HP implied trend of qit using a smoothing parameter of
λ = 1600and only quotes on qit available until t. The right hand side panel lists observations
discardedfromtheestimationprocedure. Timeperiodsmarkedwith’∗’denoteexclusiondue
to unusual ﬂuctuations in corresponding interest rates in the line of the European currency
crisis. Periods marked with ’+’ denote exclusion due to excess interest rate volatility.
25Table 2: Panel estimates for model 2

























































Parametric panel estimates for model ˇ yit = ˇ x 
itα +  it (upper part), as well as for the model
y 
it = x 
it
 θ +˜  it (lower part) where the impact of domestic policy rules is not taken into
account. Transmission parameter estimates are provided for the full sample as well as for
subsamples that are deﬁned by capital mobility( ψ
cap
it ) and FX rate volatility( ψ
fx
it) in country i
and timet. The four different states are given by:  ψ
fx,h
it ⇐⇒  ψ
fx
it ≥ Med( ψ
fx
t );  ψ
fx,l





t );  ψ
cap,h
it ⇐⇒  ψ
cap
it < Med( ψ
cap
i ) and  ψ
cap,l
it ⇐⇒  ψ
cap
it ≥ Med( ψ
cap
i ). t-statistics
based on Newey-West standard errors are given in parentheses. Panel estimates according
to the classiﬁcation in Shambaugh (2004) are given in the right panel. The corresponding
coefﬁcient estimate ˆ θ1 for yearly data in Shambaugh (2004, p.325) is 0.79 for pegs and 0.55
for nonpegs under absence of capital controls.
26Table 3: Policy parameter estimates for single countries


























































































































Policy parameter estimates for single country regressions according to model (1). t-statistics
based on Newey-West standard errors are given in parentheses.
Table 4: Factor dependence: Global inference
(ω(1),ω(2))( ω(2),ω(3))( ω(2b),ω(3))( ω(2),ω(3b))( ω(2),ω(3))b
ˇ e ˇ e/Tk 0.216 0.211 0.214 0.212 0.326
(ω(p∗),ω(q)) .022 .006 .090 .005 .134
(ω(p),ω(q∗)) .002 .000 .001 .003 .001
(ω(p∗),ω(q∗)) .000 .000 .000 .000 .003
Test for global factor dependence based on the ﬁt ˆ u ˆ u/Tk of model (6). p-values obtained by
resamplingaccordingtoappendixAaregiveninthelowerthreerows. Resamplingisdenoted
with asterisks. For instance, (ω(p)∗,ω(q)) implies that only the ﬁrst factor is resampled, while
(ω(p)∗,ω(q)∗) indicates a 2-tupel wise resampling from (ω(p),ω(q)). Accordingly, these tests
account for partial and joint factor invariance of interest rate transmission, respectively.
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Factor variables and interest rates including the corresponding reference rates (dashed) for a
selectionofeconomies(Austria, Switzerlandand Japan). According toω
(2)
it , theseeconomies
might be (on average) considered representative for not ﬂexible, intermediate and ﬂexible
currency regimes.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The upper panel presents functional coefﬁcient estimates evaluated conditional on ω =
(w(2b),w (3)) while the medium panel provides functional coefﬁcient estimates conditional
on ω =( w(2),w (3b)). The lower panel provides functional coefﬁcient estimates evaluated
conditional on ω =( w(2),w (3))b for a subsample of 1987Q1 − 1998Q4.
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